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COMMENT
UNDUE INFLUENCE IN WILLS IN ILLINOIS
WIUAP.D L. KmN*ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, in his Essay on Style, has pointed
out that the human ear delights in expressions which repeat with
slight variations the same or similar sounds. Sometimes such phrases
form catchwords and we repeat them almost oblivious of their signif-
icance. The tripping of the tongue lulls the intellect like an opiate.
Who does not relish speaking the words "parallelepiped," "estoppel in
pais," "territorial integrity," "corporate entity," or "trespass on the
case"? Another such phrase is "undue influence." The repetition of the
nasal "n" combines with the "undoo-infloo" effect of the vowels to form
a captivating catchword.
"He undue-influenced me," declared an old lady client in explaining
why she had signed certain deeds at the request of her estranged husband.
She spoke with the pleased air of a child who expects to be applauded for
the intellectual feat of uttering the word "papa" to identify a man. She
spoke as though it were only necessary to enunciate the words to end her
difficulties. Patiently I asked her what her husband had done to induce
her to sign the deeds, but she would only repeat "he undue-influenced
me." I started to explain to her what the words "undue influence" meant,
but my explanation became lame and halting and finally degenerated into
examples-none of which fitted her case in the remotest fashion.
A few years later I was under the necessity of reading all of the cases in
Illinois on undue influence. I found that the Supreme Court has been
patiently explaining for years to the members of the Bar that the words
"undue influence" do not mean what counsel think they mean. They are
not an "open sesame" to broken wills and cancelled deeds. Out of one
hundred and sixty cases in this State which I have examined, there are
only eleven cases where a decree for contestants in a will contest on the
ground of undue influence has been affirmed.' And even in most of these
* Member of the Illinois Bar.
x Moyer v. Swygart, 125111. 262, I7 N.E. 450 (i888); Hillv. Bahrns, i58 Il. 314,41 N.E.
912 (1895); Orchardson v. Cofield, 171 Ill. 14, 49 N.E. 197 (1898); Smith v. Henline, 174 Ill.
184, 5x N.E. 227 (1898); England v. Fawbush, 204 Ill. 384, 68 N.E. 526 (i9o3); Piper v.
Andricks, 209 Ill. 564, 71 N.E. 18 (19o4); Leonard v. Burtle, 226 Ill. 422, 8oN.E. 992 (1907);
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eleven cases the emphasis is quite as much on testamentary incapacity as
on undue influence.
But first let us get our ancient history. While the union of the words
"undue" and "influence" is of comparatively modem origin, the' essential
concept of coerced volition is old. Henry Swinburne, a civil lawyer, writ-
ing in 1590, makes it appear that even before the passage of the Wills Act
in 1540, testaments produced by fear, fraud or possibly by immoderate
importunity, were void.2 Shepard's Touchstone of Common Assurances
(I648) 3 after stating two examples of wills, perhaps invalid because pro-
duced by importunity, states:
'But as touching these two last things, Quare, how they shall avail in the Wills of
land which are not regulated so much by the Civill Law."
The last sentence makes it lear that the idea of invalidity of a will
through importunity is of civil law origin.4
Godolphin's "Orphan's Legacy" first published in 1674, discusses' at
some length the effect of fear, fraud or excessive importunity on wills and
testaments.
But the clich6 "undue influence" is not used by Swinburne, Shepard or
Godolphin. Not until the nineteenth century did those words come into
general use in respect to wills. Holdsworth6 states that the courts of equity
in the latter half of the seventeenth century relieved against fraud "and
also undue influence." This is, of course, true, but the case which he cites7
does not use the term "undte influence." Kerly8 indicates that the prin-
ciples of the law of undue influence were first applied in the eighteenth
century. He states, however, that "The principle on which relief would
be given was not settled till Huguenin v. Baseley9 came before Lord Eldon
in 1807." Lord Eldon uses the term "undue influence" in that case in
setting aside a voluntary settlement made by a widow upon a clergyman
who had obtained great influence over her. Eldon cites Bridgeman v.
Dowie v. Sutton, 227 Ill. 183, 8r N.E. 395 (1907); Gum v. Reep, 275 Ill. 503, 114 N.E. 271
(1916); Blackhurst v. James, 304 11. 586, i36 N.E. 754 (1922); Peters v. Fekete, 329 Ill. 268,
16o N.E. 594 (1928). Perhaps this statement gives a false emphasis. There are other cases
where a decree for proponents was reversed, but there is nothing to indicate in such cases that
a new trial did not result in another verdict for proponents.
'Swinburne on Wills (7th ed. 1793), seventh part, §§ 2, 3, 4.
3 c. 23, p. 406.
4See Reppy and Tompkins, History of Wills (1928), 21, 22. -
5 Part i, c. 17; part 3, c. 25, pars. 7, 8, 9.
6 6 History of English Law (3d ed. 1923), 66o.
7 Vere Essex v. Muschamp, i Vern. 237 (1684).
8 History of Equity (189o), 242, 243. 9 2 W. and T. Eq. Cas. 6oo, 14 Ver. 273 (1807).
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Green."° Lord Wilmot refers to "undue influence" in that case in setting
aside gifts made by a man to his valet apparently as the result of improper
relations between them. Lord Hardwicke utters the phrase once in Bennet
v. Vade"x in setting aside certain deeds, but "fraud and imposition" seem
to be his favorite words in that case. There may have been isolated cases
of the use of the term prior to that case, but, if so, I cannot find them.
Certainly "undue influence" was not in general use as a subdivision of
the law of wills until almost a hundred years thereafter. This is made clear
by an examination of the treatises. Loveless on Wills, Tenth Edition,
18o9, and Roberts on Wills, Third Edition, 1826, discuss the invalidity of
wills due to fraud or importunity, but never refer to "undue influence.""11
The first edition of Williams on Executors, published in 1832 (first Ameri-
can edition, 1833), while it contains a discussion several pages in length
on the effect of fraud, fear or over-importunity in the law of wills, uses the
term "undue influence" only once, and that quite casually at the end of
the discussion.13 The third edition of Powell on Devises, published in 1827
and edited by Thomas Jarman, refers to "restraint, duress, menace" and
"over-importuning," and never mentions "undue influence,' 4 but the
first edition of Jarman on Wills, by the same author, published eighteen
years later (i844) does use the term. 5
In the modern text books the words "undue influence" are used as a
rubric or caption to refer to a whole body of law which has grown up
around them. The quick, rank growth of this field of law is due, in my
opinion, to the captivating character of the words "undue influence," and
to the vagueness of the term. It is interesting to compare the body of law
surrounding these words after a hundred years with the much smaller and
less developed body of law surrounding the word "duress" in the law of
contracts after five hundred years of use. 6
The Supreme Court of Illinois did not begin to use the words "undue
influence" until 1866 in Dickie v. Carter.X7 It is striking to compare the
1" 2 Ves. Sr. 627, Wilm. 58 (1755).
21 Atk. 324 (1742).
" Loveless, Wills (ioth ed. 18o9), 146, 147; 1 Roberts, Wills (3d ed. 1826), 41.
'3 Williams, Executors (ist Am. ed. i833), 33-37.
14 See p. 139.
'I Jarman, Wills (ist Am. ed. 1845), 30. It is significant that Jarman uses the term in re-
porting the case of Mountain v. Bennett (1787), i Cox Eq. Cas. 353, and that the expression is
not used in the case itself.
16 See 3 Williston, Contracts (1920), c. XLII, "Duress."
'7 42 Ill. 376 (1866).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
use of the term there with its modern use. It is not used in that case as a
rubric or caption. 8 The words "undue influence" do not appear in the in-
structions to the jury. Even the syllabus does not use the words, but re-
fers instead to "improper influence." The Supreme Court held that even
if the will had been made at the instance of the principal devisee, it would
not be invalid "in the absence of all proof of fraud, compulsion or other im-
proper conduct or of improper means." Quite casually the court remarked
that the record did not show any "illegal interference, improper conduct,
or undue influence."
But in the next case, Brownfield v. Brownfield,9 the words "undue in-
fluence" are on almost every page of the opinion. An avalanche of litiga-
tion then started. Before 1870 there were three more cases; in the decade
from 1870 to i88o there were seven cases; from i88o to 18go eight cases;
from 18go to 19oo twenty-two cases; from 19oo to 191o thirty-three cases;
from 1910 to 1920 thirty-nine cases, and the same number from 1920 to
1930.20
It soon became obvious that many lawyers and juries put quite a differ-
ent interpretation on the words "undue influence" than did the Supreme
Court. And why not? The word "undue" is in daily use in a different
sense than it has in the expression "undue influence." In writing letters
we may appropriately warn our correspondents not to attach "undue"
importance to our views, or hope that they are not subjected to "undue"
annoyance by our failure to write them. We state that we have an "un-
due" regard for coffee or sweets; that we arrived home last evening at an
"undue" h6ur, and that our wives and children have an "undue" par-
tiality for us. In short, the word "undue" is in daily use as the mildest
sort of an epithet. It does not connote the grossest compulsion and coer-
cion as it does in the legal term "undue influence."
Early in the history of undue influence in Illinois the Supreme Court,
while protesting that "undue influence is a species of constructive fraud
which the court will not undertake to define by any fixed words" laid
down the following definition:
i8 The Supreme Court of Illinois was late in its cognizance of this rubric. The second edition
of Miller's Probate Practice (Irish) published in i866, has a ten page chapter under the cap-
tion "Of the Plea of Undue Influence." See c. 14, 183-193.
19 43 Ill. 147 (i867).
2o This enumeration includes all cases where the Supreme Court considered the subject of
undue influence in connection with a will. It does not include a large group of will contests
where only the subject of testamentary capacity was considered by the court nor does it in-
dude the cases where undue influence was considered in connection with deeds.
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"Undue influence is 'any improper or wrongful constraint, machination, or urgency
of persuasion whereby the will of a person is overpowered and he is induced to do or
forbear an act which he would not do, or would do if left to act freely.' "
This definition indicates how the rubric or caption of "undue influence"
has swallowed up the old concept of a will procured by fraud discussed
by Swinburne and Godolphin as well as by the other text writers prior to
the general introduction of the term "undue influence." The phrase "un-
due influence" may be an entirely proper term to convey the idea of con-
straint through over-importunity.22 But the modern authorities deplore
the confusion of fraud or deception with compulsion by importunity under
the caption of undue influence. 23
It is true that if importunity amounting to coercion is present, fraud
or deceit is also usually present, but it is confusing not to distinguish the
two things. They are essentially different. It is submitted that if our
Supreme Court would discard this time-worn definition of undue influence
and make clear the distinction between a will produced by deceit and a
will produced by importunity, a great service would be done for future
generations. The present definition serves only to confuse the jury. To
jurymen the definition is an invitation to set aside wills on any pretext
that may occur to them.
Ever since the case of Smith v. Henline 4 the Supreme Court has been
engaged in limiting the effect of this definition. Instead of clarifying it
they have (i) added further vague phraseology to it, (2) built up a high-
ly technical law of evidence in reversing cases decided under it, (3) made
acute distinctions on the language of the instructions given in such trials,
(4) raised high standards of proof which the contestant must scale to per-
mit his case to be submitted to a jury, (5) raised the standard of particu-
larity of pleading by the contestant, and (6) shifted the burden of going
forward with the evidence to militate against the contestant.
21 Smith v. Henline, 174 Ill. 184, S N.E. 227 (1898), quoting from first edition of American
and English Encyclopaedia of Law. It is to be noted that the definition was abandoned in the
second edition of the work published in 19o4. Nevertheless it still prevails in Illinois, Bigger-
staff v. Wicks, 348 Ill. 129, 135, i8o N.E. 840 (1932), and the jury are so instructed in prac-
tically every will contest.
2 "If a Man make his Will in his Sickness, by the over importunity of his Wife, to the end
that he may be quiet, this shall be said to be a will made by constraint, and shall not be a good
Will."-Roll, C. J. in Hacker v. Newborn, 82 Eng. Rep. 834 (654).
23 See i Page, Wills (2d ed. 1928), 21, 22; Rood, Wills (2d ed. 1926), § 175; Reppy andTomp-
kins, History of Wills (1928), 2r, 22; Gifford, Will or no Will? The Effect of Fraud and Undue
Influence on Testamentary Instruments, 20 Col. L. Rev. 862 (1920); Warren, Fraud, Undue
Influence and Mistake in Wills, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (r928).
24 174 Ill. 184 (1898).
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Additions to the Definition
The following remark has been repeated by the Supreme Court in prac-
tically every case:
"The undue influence which will void a will must be directly connected with the
execution of the instrument and operate at the time it is made."
It is hard to tell what the court means by this. A very good argument
may be made from the cases that this rule requires that the persons
charged with undue influence be shown to have been physically present
at the execution of the will.
The constant repetition of the rule is in the exact language as given
above, coupled with the frequent comment by the court that no showing
was made that the persons charged with undue influence were present at
the execution of the will, indicate that this is what the Supreme Court has
in mind when it uses these words. 2- As applied to importunity this is per-
haps sound. Importunity amounting to compulsion probably could not
exist unless the persons charged with it were present at the execution of
the instrument. But, as applied to threats, deceit or fraud, such a rule is
folly. Iago was not present when Othello strangled Desdemona. Obvi-
ously the grossest fraud or deceit could exist without the physical presence
at the execution of the will of the persons guilty of the fraud. However,
the Supreme Court of this State makes no such distinction. It merely
repeats: "Undue influence must be directly connected with the execution
of the will, and operate at the time it is made."
Another addition which our Supreme Court has made to its definition is:
"The influence must be such as to destroy the freedom of the testator's will and
render the instrument obviously more the offspring of the will of others than of his
own.,,
2S See Schmidt v. Schmidt, 201 Ill. 191, 66 N.E. 371 (1903): "It is clear that the will was
not and could not have been made as the result of the undue influence of Frederick W. and
his mother over the testAtor as the evidence is uncontradicted that neither of them were pres-
ent when the will was executed or had anything to do with bringing about its execution."
Woodman v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 211 Ill. 578, 71 N.E. 1099 (x904): "Here there
is no testimony whatever tending to show that either of the parties charged with having un-
duly influenced the making of the will said or did anything whatever at the time of the axecution
of it, in any way calculated to influence the testator to make any of the devises or bequests
therein mentioned." Baker v. Baker, 202 Ill. 595, 67 N.E. 410 (19o3); Cunniff v. Cunniff,
255 Ill. 407, 99 N.E. 654 (1912); Moriarity v. Palmer, 286 Ill. 96, 121 N.E. 219 (1918), where
in affirming decrees for proponents the court noted particularly that none of the persons al-
leged to have exercised undue influence were present when the will was executed. Miller v.
Blumenshine, 343 Ill. 531, 175 N.E. 814 (I931), where the persons alleged to have exercised
undue influence were in the corridor of the hospital outside testator's room when the will was
prepared and executed and the court noted particularly that none of them were actually in the
room when the will was executed.
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This remark in this form appears in almost every opinion on the sub-
ject, and the jury are usually so instructed. The instruction is ordinarily
coupled with the statement that "mere persuasion or advice or the in-
fluence of affection is not an improper influence." In other words, advice
or persuasion is proper provided it does not "destroy the freedom of the
testator's will." Free will, indeed! What testator has a free will? A hobo
might approximate it, but a testator under the law must have the capacity
to recall "the natural objects of his bounty." The fact that there are
"natural objects of his bounty" surely implies some limitation on his free
will. And every word of advice tends pro tanto to "destroy the freedom
of the testator's will." What is probably meant is that advice or persua-
sion must not grow so importunate that it overcomes his will without con-
vincing his judgment, so that the testator yields to it for the sake of peace
and quiet. But the jury are hopelessly confused by these instructions, if
they listen to them at all. 6
The Law of Evidence in Undue Influence
In the course of the years the Supreme Court of Illinois has built up a
great body of law on the exclusion of evidence in will contest cases. A trial
chancellor recently remarked to me, that in a will contest, contestants
could offer no evidence on the subject of undue influence but what pro-
ponents would be able to cite Illinois cases to the effect that the evidence
was inadmissible.
The contestants themselves cannot testify because they are incompe-
tent witnesses under the statute.2 7
The testator's statement, oral or written, that he was unduly influenced,
or his statements tending so to show, are not admissible as they are in
derogation of the wil.28 But his statements tending to show that he has
26 It is interesting to compare these usual instructions in Illinois with the instruction, to the
jury, of Sir J. P. Wilde in Hall v. Hall, L.R. i P. & D. 481,482 (i868): "Importunity or threats,
such as the testator has not the courage to resist, moral command, asserted and yielded to for
the sake of peace and quiet, or of escaping from distress of mind or social discomfort, these, if
carried to a degree in which the testator's judgment, discretion or wishes, is overborne, will
constitute undue influence, though no force is either used or threatened."
27 Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 51, § 2.
28 Dickie v. Carter, 42 Ill. 376 (1866); Rutherford v. Morris, 77 Ill. 397 (1875); Moyer v.
Swygart, 125 Ill. 262, 17 N.E. 450 (i888); Hill v. Bahns, i58 Ill. 314, 41 N.E. 912 (1895);
Kaenders v. Montague, 18o 111.300,54 N.E. 321 (1899); Wombacher v. Barthelme, 194 111. 425,
62 N.E. 80o (1902); England v. Fawbush, 204 Ill. 384, 68 N.E. 526 (19o3); Yorty v. Webster,
205 Il. 63o, 68 N.E. io68 (i9o3); Compher v. Browning, 219 Ill. 429, 76 N.E. 678 (19o6);
Floto v. Floto, 233 Ill. 6o5, 84 N.E. 712 (igog); Norton v. Clark, 253 Ill. 557, 97 N.E. 1079
(1912); Martin v. Beatty,'254 Ill. 615, 98 N.E. 996 (1912); Abbott v. Church, 288 Ill. 91, 123
N.E. 273 (i919); McCune v. Reynolds, 288 Ill. 188, 123 N.E. 317 (1919); Teter v. Spooner,
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not been unduly influenced may be put in evidence by the propo-
nents.
29
The admission of a legatee tending to show that undue influence was
exercised is not admissible against his codefendants and hence not ad-
missible at all unless the legatee making the admission is the sole legatee
or has a joint interest with the other legatees as distinguished from a com-
mon interest.30
Evidence of influence upon the testator in any other matters than the
execution of the will is not admissible.3x
Testimony that the testator was easily influenced or was susceptible to
influence is excluded as a conclusion of the witness.32
305 Ill. 198, 137 N.E. 129 (1922); Gregory v. Richey, 307M11. 219, 138 N.E. 669 (1923); Munz
v. Bort, 307 Ill. 4X2, 138 N.E. 644 (1923); Prinz v. Schmidt, 334 Ill. 576, x66 N.E. 112 (1929).
But see Reynolds v. Adams, 90 Ill. 134 (1878), that statements of the testator indicating a
mind wearied by importunities may be admitted; and see Blackhurst v..James, 304 Ill. 586,
136 N.E. 754 (1922), that revoked wills (ordinarily excluded by the above rule) may be ad-
mitted where misspelled words in such wills prove (by the fact that the same words are mis-
spelled in the will at issue) that the persons alleged to have exercised undue influence prepared
the will in issue.
29 Harp v. Parr, z68 Ill. 459, 48 N.E. 113 (1897); Baker v. Baker, 202 IIl. 505, 67 N.E. 410
(i9o3); Waters v. Waters, 222 Ill. 26, 78 N.E. i (i9o6); Cheney v. Goldy, 225 Ill. 394, 8o N.E.
289 (1907); Freund v. Becker, 235 Ill. 513, 85 N.E. 61o (igo8); Pilstrand v. Swedish Methodist
Church, 275 Ill. 46, 113 N.E. 958 (igx6).
30 McMillan v. McDill, 110 Ill. 47 (1884); Dowie v. Driscoll, 203 Il. 480, 68 N.E. 56 (i9o3),
Cunniff v. Cunniff, 255 Ill. 407, 99 N.E. 654 (r912); Kellan v. Kelan, 258 Ill. 256, oi N.E.
614 (1913). See this case criticized in 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923), 728, § x738; the same
author criticizes the rule in Vol. 2, § zoSi. McCune v, Reynolds, 288 Ill. r88, 123 N.E. 317
(igrg); Powell v. Bechtel, 340 Ill. 330, 172 N.E. 765 (193o). "But such declarations are ad-
missible where declarer has a joint interest instead of a common interest." Campbell v. Camp-
bell, 138 Ill. 612 (i8gi); Smith v. Henline, 174 Ill. 284, 51 N.E. 227 (1898), or where legatee
making admissions is sole legatee; Lyman v. Kaul, 275 Ill. i, 113 N.E. 944 (Irg6); but ad-
mission of sole proponent not admissible where other legatees defaulted; Joyal v. Pilotte, 293
Ill. 377, 127 N.E. 74r (192o). The basis of the principal rule is that it would be unfair to per-
mit the interest of all the legatees to be swept away by the admissions of one legatee. As thus
stated the rule would be as applicable to testimony of a legatee as to his admissions. However,
the Supreme Court has recently held that the rule does not apply to exclude a legatee from
testifying, Brownlie v. Brownlie, 351 Ill. 72, 183 N.E. 613 (X932).
31 Waterman v. Hall, 291 Ill. 304, 126 N.E. 139 (1920); Grosh v. Saom, 325 Ill. 474, 156
N.E. 485 (1927); Pollock v. Pollock, 328 Ill. 179, 259 N.E. 305 (x928); but see England v.
Fawbush, 204 Ill. 384, 68 N.E. 526 (i9o3); Blackhurst v. James, 304 Ill. 586, x36 N.E. 754
(X922), that such evidence might be admitted if direct connection is shown.
32 Michael v. Marshall, 201 Ill. 70, 66 N.E. 273 (I9o3); Larabee v. Larabee, 240 Ill. 576,
88 N.E. 1037 (i9o9); Lyman v. Kaul, 275 Ill. I, 113 N.E. 944 (igi6); Teter v. Spooner, 279
Ill. 39, 116 N.E. 673 (I927).
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Letters written to the testator cannot be introduced in the absence of
proof that he acted upon them. 33
Letters from him tending to show undue influence are not admissible
because they would be in derogation of the will.34
Evidence of the financial condition of heirs who are disinherited is not
admissible without proof that such condition was known to the testator,
nor is evidence of the financial condition of a legatee who is alleged to have
exercised undue influence is not admissible.35
Instructions to the Jury
In the case of Yoe v. McCord36 the trial court instructed the jury that if
Yoe acquired such dominion or influence over McCord in relation to his
property as to prevent the exercise of a sound discretion on his part in
relation thereto, then the will would not be valid. The case was reversed,
and the Supreme Court said:
"We regard this instruction as erroneous, in that it does not embrace the element of
fraud or wrong in the dominion ** *. To avoid a will the influence which is exercised
must be undue, and this, in a legal sense, is something wrongful, a species of fraud."
But this appears to have been overruled in the case of Dowie v. Sutton37
where the court said that an instruction was proper which told the jury
that if the testator was "so far under the dominion of any person as to
prevent the free exercise of his judgment," he was not of disposing mind
and memory. It was argued that the word "dominion" in this instruction
should have been qualified by the word "wrongful." But the court said
that "an influence exerted over another which deprives him of his free
agency" cannot be other than wrongful.
Again, in the case of Rutherford v. Morris,38 an instruction was held
erroneous which allowed the jury to consider the "equity or inequity of
the will" with other circumstances in the case in determining whether
there was any undue influence.
But this was reversed in the case of Pooler v. Cristman,39 where the court
held that "inequality in the distribution of property may be considered
33 Crumbaugh v. Owen, 238 Ill. 497, 87 N.E. 312 (igog); Snell v. Weldon, 239 Il1. 279, 87
N.E. 1022 (1909).
34 Supra, note 28.
3s O'Day v. Crabb, 269 Ill. 123, io9 N.E. 724 (1915).
36 74 I. 33 (,874).
37 227 Ill. 183, Sr N.E. 395 (1907).
3' 77 Ill. 397 (1875). 39 145 Ill. 405, 34 N.E. 57 (1893).
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as a circumstance tending to establish undue influence .... but is not, of
itself, sufficient for that purpose." On the authority of the last case, in
Dowie v. Sutton,40 an instruction was approved which allowed the jury to
take into consideration, in considering the question of undue influence, the
propriety or impropriety, "the reasonableness or unreasonableness" of the
will. But this appears in turn to have been overruled sub silentio in Don-
nan v. Donnan,' 4 where the Supreme Court reversed the case because of
the giving of substantially the same instruction.
Higher Standards of Proof
In 19o6, the Supreme Court of Illinois adopted the rule that it is not
sufficient for the contestants to show that the circumstances attending the
execution of the will are consistent with the hypothesis of undue influence.
"It must-be shown that they are inconsistent with a contrary hypothe-
sis. ' ' 42 This rule has ever since been adhered to. 43
In effect this forces the contestants to prove their case beyond a reason-
able doubt, as a crime must be proved, instead of by a preponderance of
the evidence which is usually sufficient to permit recovery by the plaintiff
in civil cases.
In a great many cases the Supreme Court has approved the action of
the trial court in withdrawing from the jury the issue of undue influence
or has reversed for failure of the trial chancellor to do so.44
40 227 Ill. I83, 8I N.E. 395 (1907).
4' 236 Ill. 34I, 86 N.E. 279 (i9o8).
42 Compher v. Browning, 219 Ill. 429, 44I, 76-N.E. 678 (i9o6), adopted from opinion of
Lord Cranworth in Boyse v. Rossborough, 6 H.L. Cas. 2 (1857).
43 Waterman v. Hall, 291 Ill. 304, 126 N.E. 139 (1920); Cunningham v. Dorwart, 317 Ill.
45', 458, 148 N.E. 314 (1925).
44 Wilbur v. Wilbur, 129 Ill. 392, 21 N.E. 1076 (I8go); Thompson v. Bennett, 194 Il1. 57,
62 N.E. 321 (i9o2); Yorty v. Webster, 205 Ill. 63 o , 68 N.E. io68 (1903); Woodman v. Illinois
Trust and Savings Bank, 211 Ill. 578, 71 N.E. o99 (i9o4); Wickes v. Walden, 228 I11. 56, 8r
N.E. 798 (x9o7); Bauchens v. Davis, 229 Ill. 557, 82 N.E. 365 (i9o7); Floto v. Floto, 233 Ill.
605, 84 N.E. 712 (i9o8); Larabee v. Larabee, 240 Ill. 576, 88 N.E. 1037 (i909); Hutchinson v.
Hutchinson, 250ll. 170,95 N.E. 143 (1911); Bowles v. Bryan, 254 Ill. 148, 9 8N.E. 230 (1913);
Martin v. Beatty, 254 11. 615, 98 N.E. 996 (1912); Beemer v. Beemer, 256 Ill. 312, ioo N.E.
135 (1912); Doyle v. Doyle, 257 Ill. 229, ioo N.E. 95o (i913); Lloyd v. Rush, 273 Ill. 489, 113
N.E. 122 (z916); McCune v. Reynolds, 288 Ill. i88, 123 N.E. 317 (1919); Waterman v. Hall,
291 IM. 304, 126 N.E. 139 (1920); Daugherty v. State Savings Bank, 292 M11. 147, 126 N.E.
545 (X920); Chaney v. Baker, 304 Ill. 362, 136 N.E. 804 (1923); Gregory v. Richey, 307 Ill.
219, 138 N.E. 669 (1923); Munz v. Bort, 307 I. 412, 138 N.E. 644 (1923); Pond v. Hollett,
31o ll. 31, 41 N.E. 403 (1924); Grantz v. Grantz, 314 fI. 243, 145 N.E. 398 (1925); Britt v.
Darnell, 315 Ill. 385, 146 N.E. 51o (1925); Grosh v. Acorn, 325 Ill. 474, i56 N.E. 485 (1927);
Pollock v. Pollock, 328 Ill. 179, 159 NE. 305 (1928); Bailey v. Oberlander, 329 Ill. 568, I61
N.E. 65 (1928); Flanigon v. Smith, 337 Ill. 572, I69 N.E. 767 (i93o); Greenlees v. Allen, 341
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Particularity of Pleading
In 1928 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to strike a tremendous
blow at the swarm of will contests which was oppressing it. In the case
of Ater v. McClure,4 5 in a strong dictum, they held that "It is not sufficient
to aver undue influence as a conclusion. Facts must be stated warranting
the conclusion and go to the extent of showing that thereby the testator
was deprived of his free agency."
Of course, all of our pleadings both at common law and in equity are
largely made up of conclusions of law and of fact. The device of discourag-
ing certain classes of actions by requiring facts to be pleaded is an ancient
one.46
In 1931, the Supreme Court affirmed the sustaining of a demurrer to a
bill on the ground that the facts constituting undue influence were not
sufficiently pleaded.47 In this case they indicated that the contestants
must set out the words the utterance of which is claimed to have induced
the execution of the will. This, of course, is the same plan adopted by the
English courts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to discourage
actions of defamation. 48 Apparently hereafter it will not be sufficient to
allege that a wife procured the will by importunities which the enfeebled
testator was unable to resist. That is no less a conclusion than that she
procured the will by undue influence. Rigidly enforced, this rule will prac-
tically abolish the will contest on the ground of undue influence except
in those cases where the draftsman of the will is a substantial beneficiary.
Burden of Going Forward with Evidence
In January, 1934, the Supreme Court adopted a new rule49 designed to
put a heavier burden on contestants in will contests. Heretofore the pro-
Ill. 262, x73 N.E. 121 (1931); Long v. Brink, 353 Ill. 549, 187 N.E. 5o8 (1933); Johnson v.
First Union Trust and Savings Bank, 273 Ill. App. 472 (1934). In the following cases the with-
drawal of the issue of undue influence by the trial court was held erroneous: Purdy v. Hall,
13 4 Ill. 298, 25 N.E. 645 (189o) (beneficiary procured draftsman and was present at execution);
Yess v. Yess, 255 Ill. 414, 99 N.E. 687 (1912) (beneficiary procured draftsman and acted as
interpreter); Donnan v. Donnan, 256 Ill. 244, 99 N.E. 93 (1912) (beneficiary took testator to
draftsman, testator could not read); Abbott v. Church, 288 Ill. 91, 123 N.E. 306 (i919) (bene-
ficiary drew will.)
4S 329 Ill. 519, 16i N.E. 129 (X928).
4 See Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleadings under the Codes, 21 Col. L. Rev. 416 (I921);
Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 501 (x918).
47 Heavner v. Heavner, 342 Ill. 321, 174 N.E. 413 (193).
48 Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898), 288.
49 Rule 25 of Sup. Ct., adopted Jan. 1, 1934.
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ponents have been required first to produce their evidence to sustain the
will, and then the contestants produced evidence. This was an advantage
to the contestants. It forced the proponents to go into all of the circum-
stances surrounding the execution of the will while the contestants could
bide their time and fit their theory to the facts produced by proponents.
By the new rule this is reversed: "In proceedings to contest the validity
of a will, testament or codicil, the contestant shall in the first instance
proceed with proof to establish the invalidity of such instrument; and the
proponent may then present evidence to sustain the will, testament or
codicil."
This adds yet another burden to the already heavily laden contestant.
Fiduciary Relationship
An expression which appears in most will contests and which, like
"undue influence," has proved captivating to courts and lawyers, is
"fiduciary relationship." Again the iteration of consonant sounds, the
tripping of the tongue that lulls the intellect, may be observed. There is
much brave talk in the cases on "fiduciary relationships." I venture
the suggestion, however, that the significance of a fiduciary relationship
in a will contest is exactly nothing.
In 1904, the Supreme Court declared:
"Where a fiduciary relation exists between the testator and a devisee who receives
a substantial benefit from the will and where the testator is the dependent and the
devisee the dominant party and the testator therefore reposes trust and confidence in
the devisee as in the ordinary relation of attorney and client, and where the will is
written, or its preparation procured, by that beneficiary, proof of these facts establishes
primafacie the charge that the execution of the will was the result of undue influence
exercised by that beneficiary, and this proof standing alone and undisputed by other
proof entitles contestants to a verdict."sO
The court here said that three elements raised the presumption of undue
influence:
A. A fiduciary relationship.
B. Writing or procurement of the will.
C. A substantial legacy-to the person writing or procuring the will.
But elements B and C raise the same presumption without element A. If
a stranger to the testator wrote or procured the writing of a will in which
he was a substantial beneficiary the same presumption-perhaps a
stronger presumption, in fact-would arise. Ever since the Lex Cornelia
so Weston v. Teufel, 213 IHl. 291, 299, 72 N.E. 9o8 (i904).
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(42 B.c.) it has been the law: "He who writes himself heir shall be in-
famous and his legacy void."'s
If a red-haired man writes or procures a will in which he is a substantial
beneficiary, a presumption of undue influence arises. Obviously the fidu-
ciary relation is as immaterial as the red hair. The Supreme Court of
Illinois has in effect so held,5 2 but the words "fiduciary relationship" still
remain in the opinions and instructions to plague the courts and confuse
the juries.
Conclusion
We thus find the courts of Illinois picking up a catch-word of compara-
tively modem origin in the phrase "undue influence." We find them strug-
gling to define its vague content. We find them accepting a definition
which, instead of restricting, expands its scope and effect. Then we find
them struggling to prevent that expansion by every means which their
ingenuity could devise. No one will say that their struggle has not been
successful,-but what of the cost to litigants? Two generations of citizens
of the state have spent untold wealth in litigating the significance of "un-
due influence." Is it not time that this waste be stopped by a clear re-
statement by the court of the whole subject in the light of modem methods
and research?
s "Si quis legatum sibi adscripserit, tenetur poena legis Cornelia, quamnvis inutile legalum sit."
-Corpus Juris Civilis, Recognoverunt Adnotationibusque Criticus Instructuin-Ediderunt D.
Albertus, et al. (ioth ed. 1865), 9o5; Andrews v. Powis, r Lee 242 (Eccles. 1728).
s2 That fiduciary relation is immaterial in the absence of writing or procurement of will by
fiduciary see Waterman v. Eall, 291 Ill. 304, 126 N.E. 139 (1920); Cunningham v. Dorwart,
3r7 Il. 451, 148 N.E. 314 (1925); Jones v. Worth, 319 Ill. 225, i49 N.E. 793 (1926); Pollock
v. Pollock, 328 Ill. I79, i59 N.E. 305 (1928). That fiduciary relation is immaterial in the
absence of substantial legacy to person writing or procuring will see Compher v. Browning,
2X9 111. 429, 76 N.E. 678 (i9o6); Trubey v. Richardson, 224 Ill. 136, 79 N.E. 592 (i9o6);
Williams v. Ragland, 307 Ill. 386, 138 N.E. 599 (X923); Pond v. Hollett, 3o 111. 31, 141 N.E.
403 (1924).
